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Cutting the Fat Out of Health-Care Costs: Why Medicare
and Medicaid Write-Offs Should Not Be Recoverable
Under Oklahoma’s Collateral Source Rule
I. Introduction
An all-too-common conversation taking place around the American kitchen
table concerns increasing health-care costs and the hardships associated with
this trend.  In fact, long before the current debate over health-care reform took
shape, one poll reported that 80% of the public expressed dissatisfaction with
the cost of health care.1  There is good reason for such dissatisfaction.  As of
September 2008, approximately fifty-seven million Americans were members
of families that were having a difficult time paying their medical bills.2
Moreover, the average cost for family health-care coverage was
approximately $12,680 a year, a 5% increase over the 2007 average.3  Though
high, this cost pales in comparison with the estimated $4.1 trillion of total
national health-care expenditures that are expected by 2016.4  If these
projections are accurate, total expenditures on health care in 2016 will
represent nearly 20% of the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP).5
Oklahomans are not strangers to the woes of rising health-care costs.  As
of 2008, 16% of Oklahomans did not have health insurance.6  Additionally,
health-care costs in Oklahoma grew 6.7% annually between 1991 and 2004.7
While Oklahoma and the rest of America have felt the impact of increased
health-care costs, the question of how to address this problem remains.  To
answer this question, we must determine where these increases come from
and how to decrease them in the future.  According to the National Coalition
on Health Care, experts agree that the American “health care system is riddled
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8. NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 1 (2009), http://nchc.
org/sites/default/files/resources/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Cost.pdf (emphasis added).
9. Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Rates Are Rising Sharply; Health Costs Follow, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at A1 (quoting Kenneth S. Abramowitz, Managing Dir., Carlyle Group).
10. See Stephen L. Olson & Pat Wasson, Is the Collateral Source Rule Applicable to
Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs?, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 172, 172 (2004).
11. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2281, 2283 (2003); see also Jeff Watters, Note, Better to Kill Than to Maim: The Current
State of Medical Malpractice Wrongful Death Cases in Texas, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 755
(2008) (describing the finding of the Texas Legislature’s Senate Special Committee on Prompt
Payment of Health Care Providers that “increasing and excessive litigation and jury verdicts
were central factors in the steep rise of medical malpractice premiums”).  But see Joseph
Treaster & Joel Brinkley, Behind Those Medical Malpractice Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005,
at C1 (attributing the rise in medical malpractice rates to a broader range of factors, including
changes in competition in the health industry and the lower returns on insurance companies’
earnings).
12. Amy C. Waltz, Note, Closing the Deal: Making the Right Congressional Decision
About Patent Settlement Agreements, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 155, 156 (2008).
13. JOSEPH L. VERHEIJDE, 22 ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS, MANAGING CARE: A SHARED
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Henk van Lujik & Patircia Werhane eds., 2006).
14. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q.
J. ECON. 353, 383 (1996) (arguing that reforming medical malpractice laws in order to reduce
liability for health-care providers would reduce medical expenditures by 5%–9% without
substantially affecting major health outcomes).
15. See Westlaw.com, 50 State Statutory Surveys, Health Care Medical Malpractice: Tort
Reform, Oct. 2009, available at 0100 SURVEYS 45.
 with inefficiencies, excessive administrative expenses, inflated prices, poor
management, and inappropriate care, waste and fraud,” all of which correlate
with significant increases in health-care costs.8  Health-care prices are
comprised, in part, of the cost of physician services, and “[t]he rising cost of
malpractice coverage is becoming one of the most important factors driving
inflation for physicians’ services.”9  As of 2004, a majority of awards in
medical malpractice suits exceeded $1 million, and the average award was
$3.5 million.10  Consequently, many commentators attribute the rising cost of
health care to large lawsuit verdicts and settlements.11
“In an era of rapidly rising health care costs, America’s legislators are
continually searching for ways to decrease costs to the consumer,”12 and
public discussion and debate have long focused on determining methods for
providing cost-effective and adequate health care.13  Some scholars have
suggested that legislatures should reform medical malpractice laws as a way
to reduce medical costs,14 and all states, including Oklahoma, have followed
their suggestion in some form or fashion.15  In 2003, Oklahoma governor Brad
Henry and the Oklahoma Legislature passed a version of tort reform, the
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16. Affordable Access to Health Care Act, ch. 390, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws. 1678 (codified
as amended at 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1708.1A-.1I (Supp. 2009)).
17. Ray Carter, Henry Signs Tort Reform Legislation, J. REC. (Okla. City), June 5, 2003,
at 1.  Subsequent attempts to pass additional tort reform have been difficult.  See Janice Francis-
Smith, Lawmakers Ditch Idea to Limit Contingency Fees, J. REC. (Okla. City), Apr. 25, 2008,
at 3A.  It should be noted, however, that the state legislature recently passed a much broader
version of tort reform, see Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009, ch. 228, 2009 Okla.
Sess. Laws 935, which included some amendments to the 2003 medical malpractice reform
package.  Compare 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1708.1A-.1G (Supp. 2003), with 63 OKLA. STAT. §§
1-1708.1A-.1I (Supp. 2009).  Nevertheless, none of these further reform measures have altered
the collateral source rule.  John Brock, Editorial, Lawsuit Reform Good News for Oklahoma,
TULSA WORLD, June 3, 2009, at A21 (“The new law covers every issue on our list except
Collateral Source Rule Reform.”).
18. Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 173.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979).
20. Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of State Tort Reforms on Physician Malpractice
Payments, 26 HEALTH AFF. 500, 502 (2007); cf. Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice
‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, 23 HEALTH AFF. w4-20, w4-26
(Supp. Web Exclusives 2004) (finding that discretionary collateral setoffs are associated with
lower premiums and improved profits, but mandatory setoffs are not).  But see Ronen Avraham,
An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 208 (2007) (finding that “collateral source reform decrease[d] average
awards by 17–32 percent,” but concluding that this decrease was not particularly significant in
either of the statistical models used in the study to analyze awards).
21. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 77.
Affordable Access to Health Care Act (AAHCA).16  The AAHCA specifically
targets medical malpractice litigation and reflects the policy goal of
“ensur[ing] that Oklahomans have access to high-quality, affordable health
care.”17 
Of all the states adopting some variety of tort reform in an effort to lower
medical malpractice awards, more than thirty have legislatively modified or
abrogated what is known as the collateral source rule.18  The traditional
collateral source rule provides that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred
on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the
tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which
the tortfeasor is liable.”19  In other words, just because an injured plaintiff’s
medical bills are covered by a third party does not mean that the negligent
party can offset its own liability on the basis that the injured party has already
been compensated.  Some studies show that modification or abrogation of this
rule lowers malpractice costs20 and, therefore, overall health-care costs.  Some
studies even show that allowing collateral source offsets decreases
malpractice awards between 11% and 18%.21
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22. See Milt Freudenheim, Low Payments by U.S. Raise Medical Bills Billions a Year, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2006, at C3 (discussing how private payers are charged more for medical
services to make up for the underpayments by Medicare and Medicaid).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(n) (2006)
(Medicaid).  The regulations corresponding to these statutes may be found at 42 C.F.R. §
489.21(a) (2009) (Medicare) and 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2009) (Medicaid).
Medicare and Medicaid write-offs are specific types of collateral source
offsets that have generated tremendous confusion.  When doctors or other
health-care providers agree to treat Medicare or Medicaid patients, they bill
these two programs instead of a private insurance company.  Unlike many
private insurance companies, these two social programs typically only pay
back a portion of the amount billed,22 and the difference between the amount
billed and the amount paid is written off as a loss to the health-care provider
by operation of federal law.23  Currently, courts do not agree on a uniform
application of the collateral source rule to these write-offs.  Some
jurisdictions hold that the collateral source rule prohibits defendants from
entering these write-offs into evidence, while other jurisdictions hold that the
rule is inapplicable to these write-offs.  Still others find the rule inapplicable
to Medicaid write-offs but applicable to Medicare write-offs on the basis of
varying policy rationales.
This comment focuses on the heterogeneous application of the collateral
source rule to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, the prevailing jurisdictional
methods for interpreting the rule, and the policy rationales supporting each
interpretation.  Additionally, this comment evaluates the collateral source rule
in Oklahoma and concludes that, in light of Oklahoma’s legislative policy of
lowering health-care costs, a reasonable and preferable interpretation of the
collateral source rule dictates that the rule be inapplicable to both Medicare
and Medicaid write-offs.
Part II of this comment presents the history of the collateral source rule,
both generally and in Oklahoma.  Part III provides a detailed analysis of the
different approaches courts take when deciding whether to apply the rule to
Medicare and Medicaid write-offs and contends that recoverable damages
should be limited to the amounts paid by Medicare and Medicaid.  Part IV
discusses Oklahoma’s new formulation of the collateral source rule and the
newly articulated policy goals that counsel against applying the rule to
Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.  This comment concludes in Part V by
arguing that it is important for Oklahoma courts to decide this specific issue




24. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Collateral Source Rule: Injured Person’s Hospitalization
or Medical Insurance as Affecting Damages Recoverable, 77 A.L.R. 3D 415, 419 (1977).
25. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854), cited in Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, p. 13 (La.
7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 700 (La. 2004) (“The origins of the collateral source rule can be traced
to a decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1854, The Propeller Monticello v.
Mollison.”).
26. Id. at 152.
27. Id. at 154.
28. See id. at 155.
29. Id.  The Court further explained that “[t]he insurer does not stand in the relation of a
joint trespasser, so that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others.”  Id.
30. Id.
31. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. e (1939).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979).
33. Id. § 920A cmt. b.
34. Id. § 920A(2).
II. History of the Collateral Source Rule
A. General Overview and Trends
The collateral source rule originated in English common law around 182324
and first appeared in American courts in 1854 when the United States Supreme
Court decided The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison.25  This case arose when
a propeller (a type of steamboat), Monticello, collided on Lake Huron with a
schooner, the Northwestern, and the schooner lost its entire cargo.26  The
schooner was insured, and the owner recovered the insured value of the ship
and cargo before trial began.27  Despite the propeller owner’s argument that he
was no longer liable because the schooner’s damages had already been paid,
the Court held that the owner of the propeller was still liable for the damages.28
The Court reasoned that “[t]he contract with the insurer [was] in the nature of
a wager between third parties, with which the trespasser ha[d] no concern.”29
In short, the tortfeasor was required to pay for the damage he had caused even
though the owner had already recovered the value of his losses from a
collateral source.30
The drafters of the Restatement (First) of Torts briefly mentioned the
collateral source rule;31 however, it was not until the drafting of the
Restatement (Second) that the rule was formally embraced by the drafters.32
The second Restatement defines “collateral source benefits” as “[p]ayments
made or benefits conferred by other sources,”33 and the general rule provides
that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other
sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover
all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.”34  Therefore,
benefits received by a plaintiff “from a source wholly independent of” the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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35. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392 (2003).
36. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) explicitly recognized that the collateral source
rule could allow a plaintiff to receive a double recovery.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920A cmt. b.
37. Though an injured plaintiff may recover both medical insurance benefits from his
insurance company and damages from the tortfeasor, “nearly all courts agree that the doctrine
of subrogation requires [the injured plaintiff] to repay the . . . medical payments to his insurer.”
Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Comment, Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie Isn’t Big Enough,
Who Eats Last?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (1997) (citing 16 MARK S. RHODES, 16 COUCH
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:29, at 109 (Law Co-op ed., rev. vol. 1983)).  Subrogation
gives an insurance company the right to recover the amount the company has paid out to the
insured.  See id. (citing Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Wis. 1977)).
Thus, subrogation may keep an injured plaintiff from truly recovering double damages,
depending on the specific terms of the insurance contract at issue.  See id.  But the
Congressional Budget Office provides evidence that “insurers often do not exercise th[e] right
[of subrogation] for at least three reasons.  First, it can be difficult to establish that a certain
award covers the same damages as an insurance benefit; second, administrative costs are large;
and third, those actions may contribute to ill will among customers.”  CARY ELLIOT ET AL., U.S.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 6 n.15
(2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/ doc5549/Report.pdf.
wrongdoer do not decrease the damages that an injured plaintiff can recover
from the wrongdoer.35
For example, suppose that John Doe falls and breaks his arm in the parking
lot of Harry’s Burger Joint as a result of the restaurant’s negligence.  Suppose
further that John Doe is covered by private insurance that he purchased either
individually or through his employment, and assume that John’s damages are
approximately $10,000.  After John is taken to the hospital and treated, the
health-care provider bills John’s insurance for $10,000, and the insurance
company in turn pays the health-care provider the billed amount.  In this case,
John has a negligence claim against Harry’s Burger Joint for $10,000, the
amount of damages he suffered.  The traditional collateral source rule would
prevent Harry’s Burger Joint from entering into evidence the fact that John’s
private insurance had already paid for the damages John incurred.
This simple illustration of the collateral source rule highlights one of the
main criticisms of the rule—the possibility of double recoveries.36  In the
above illustration, John would not only receive the medical treatment to repair
his arm, which was billed at $10,000 and paid for by his insurance; he would
also receive $10,000 for the negligence claim against Harry’s Burger Joint.
In essence, the collateral source rule would allow John to recover $20,000
worth of damages,37 even though he only suffered $10,000 worth of damages.
The policy rationale for allowing these double recoveries is straightforward:
[R]educing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by the
plaintiff would grant a windfall to the defendant by allowing a
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss3/9
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38. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages, supra note 35, § 392.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a.
40. See Guillermo G. Zorogastua, Comment, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid
Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (2007).
41. Charles W. Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 32 INS. COUNS.
J. 32, 32 (1965).
42. See David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory Reform and
Special Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 89 tbl.1 (2008) (figure current through Aug. 12, 2005) (finding
that twelve jurisdictions retain the common law collateral source rule); see also Jamie L.
Wershbale, Comment, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the Collateral Source Rule Across
the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 351 n.49 (2008) (noting that seventeen jurisdictions retain
the common law collateral source rule “without statutory modification, or the statutory
modification [has been] repealed or struck down”).
43. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 527 & n.4 (2005).
44. Schap & Feeley, supra note 42, at 89 tbl.1.
credit for the reasonable value of those benefits.  Such credit would
result in the benefits being effectively directed to the tortfeasor and
from the intended party—the injured plaintiff.  If there is a
windfall, it is considered more just that the injured person profit
rather than grant the wrongdoer relief from full responsibility for
the wrongdoing.38
The rule and policy rationale supporting it would place John Doe in a better
financial position than he was in before he slipped and fell.  But the possibility
of double recovery runs counter to the established principle of fair
compensation, which provides that an injured plaintiff should be restored to
a position as similar as possible to his position before the injury.39  So, which
policy should win?
Modern critiques of the collateral source rule, combined with the rising cost
of health care, best support the policy of fair compensation and thus suggest
that application of the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid write-
offs should be headed down “the path to extinction.”40  Despite once being one
of the most universally accepted doctrines in state and federal courts,41 the
common law form of the collateral source rule is currently retained by only a
few jurisdictions.42  This trend is particularly noticeable when examined in the
context of medical liability claims.  State legislatures have looked at
abrogating and even eliminating the collateral source rule in order to limit
medical malpractice plaintiffs’ recoverable damages.43  As of 2005, twenty-one
states had statutes providing that evidence of collateral source payments may
be introduced in medical malpractice suits.44  Against the backdrop of this
modern, national trend, the question in Oklahoma, a state that has yet to
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592 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:585
45. 1939 OK 227, ¶ 15, 91 P.2d 673, 676.
46. Id. ¶ 3, 91 P.2d at 674.
47. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 91 P.2d at 674.
48. See id. ¶¶ 7-8, 91 P.2d at 674-75.
49. Id. ¶ 15, 91 P.2d at 676.
50. Id. 
51. See Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 1951 OK 11, ¶ 26, 229 P.2d 560, 564.
52. See id.
address this issue, is whether its collateral source rule permits a plaintiff to
recover the portion of a medical bill written off by Medicare or Medicaid.  To
answer this question, one must understand Oklahoma’s adoption of the
collateral source rule, and its evolution up to the present day.
B. Overview of Oklahoma’s Collateral Source Rule
The development of the collateral source rule in Oklahoma has followed a
path similar to the national trend of limiting the application of the common law
form of the rule.  The collateral source rule first appeared in Oklahoma case
law in Capitol Hill Burial Ass’n v. Oliver.45  Olan Oliver purchased a burial
certificate from Capitol Hill Burial Association to cover future burial costs for
himself and his family members.46  The association’s agent, however, did not
deliver Oliver’s application to the association before Oliver’s twelve-year-old
child died, and because the “application was approved and the certificate
issued without including the deceased son after the boy’s death,” another
funeral home took care of the boy’s services.47  Oliver sued the association for
the costs of the funeral and burial expenses that the association, had it
processed Oliver’s application in a more timely manner, would otherwise have
covered.48  In its defense, the association claimed that the other funeral home’s
costs had partly been paid by third parties—the county and a private
individual.49  The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this defense and
ultimately held that “[a]s a general rule partial compensation received from a
collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer cannot operate to lessen
the damages recoverable from the latter.”50
Although Capitol Hill marked the first reference to the collateral source rule
by an Oklahoma court, it was not until 1951 in Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted Oklahoma law as incorporating the
rule in the context of common law tort actions.51  In Denco Bus Lines, the
court interpreted title 23, section 61 of the Oklahoma Statutes as though the
collateral source rule were included in its language.52  This statute provides
that “[f]or the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure
of damages . . . is the amount which will compensate for all detriment
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss3/9
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53. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 61 (1941).
54. Denco Bus Lines, ¶ 26, 229 P.2d at 564.
55. Blythe v. Univ. of Okla., 2003 OK 115, ¶¶ 7-8, 82 P.3d 1021, 1026-27 (discussing 85
OKLA. STAT. § 45(A) (2001)).
56. See id. ¶ 8, 82 P.3d at 1026.
57. Id. ¶ 8, 82 P.3d at 1026-27 (“While this section of The Workers’ Compensation Act has
never been expressly labeled ‘the collateral source rule,’ the meaning and application of the
statutory provision clearly mirrors that common law damages rule in the context of workers’
compensation awards and/or benefits.”).
58. Id. ¶ 8, 82 P.3d at 1027.
59. Up to this point, there were few exceptions to the common law collateral source rule.
See e.g., 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155(14) (2001) (providing that “[t]he state or a political subdivision
shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from . . . [a]ny loss to any person covered by any
workers’ compensation act or any employer’s liability act”).
60. 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1708.1A-.1G (Supp. 2003) (current version at 63 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 1-1708.1A-.1I (Supp. 2009)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. d
(1979) (“The collateral-source rule is of common law origin and can be changed by statute.”).
proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.”53
Analyzing this statutory language, the court reason that
it is the duty of the wrongdoer to answer for the damages wrought
by his wrongful act, and that is measured by the whole loss so
caused.  Under the statute the receipt of compensation by the
injured party from a collateral source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer would not operate to lessen the damages recoverable
from the person causing the injury.54
This passage in Denco signaled Oklahoma’s formal adoption of the collateral
source rule.
Since the supreme court’s 1951 decision, most Oklahoma courts have held
steadfast to the rule’s general application and interpretation.  Oklahoma courts
have even interpreted the workers’ compensation statute, title 85, section
45(A) of the Oklahoma Statutes, to include the collateral source rule.55  Even
though the language of this statute has remained unaltered since its original
enactment in 1915,56 it was not until 2003 that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the statute effectively codified the collateral source rule for purposes
of workers’ compensation,57 barring employers from obtaining a set-off when
injured workers receive compensation from private insurance in addition to
workers’ compensation.58 
The common law collateral source rule remained the same until 2003,59
when the Oklahoma Legislature passed the AAHCA,60 Oklahoma’s version of
medical tort reform.  The purpose of the Act was 
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61. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-1708.1B(B) (emphasis added).
62. See James A. Higgins, Oklahoma’s Tort Reform Act: Texas-Style Tort Reform or Texas-
Size Compromise?, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 921, 926 (2004).
63. Id. (citing 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1.1708.1D); see also supra note 37.
64. Higgins, supra note 62, at 926.
65. See Simpson v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., No. 07-CV-0157-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL 3388739,
at *2, *5, *9 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude
evidence of amounts billed prior to Medicare write-off).
to implement reasonable, comprehensive, and effective medical
liability reforms designed to: 
1. Improve the availability of health care services; 
2. Lower the cost of medical liability insurance;
3. Ensure that persons with meritorious health care injury claims
receive fair and adequate compensation; and 
4. Improve the fairness and cost-effectiveness of [Oklahoma’s]
current medical liability system to resolve disputes over, and
provide compensation for, medical liability.61
Reform of Oklahoma’s collateral source rule was an important component
of the Act.62  The Act modified the rule and allowed for the admission of
evidence of medical bill payments in medical liability actions, with an
exception for payments subject to subrogation by the injured party’s insurer.63
Following the national trend, Oklahoma intended the Act to reform the
common law rule, because the traditional rule created an incentive to file
lawsuits “by inflating the size of possible judgments.”64
Although Oklahoma state courts have never specifically addressed whether
the collateral source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, a
federal court in Oklahoma arguably misconstrued the rule by deciding that it
applies to Medicare write-offs despite the AAHCA and the policy
considerations supporting the Act.65  The following section analyzes the
heterogeneous jurisdictional interpretations of the collateral source rule and
contends that a reasonable interpretation of Oklahoma’s collateral source rule
reveals that it should not apply to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs. 
III. State Split: Application of the Collateral Source Rule to Medicare and
Medicaid Write-Offs
This section begins in Part A with a brief introduction to the characteristics
of Medicare and Medicaid and the write-offs that accompany each of these
government programs.  Part B provides a look at the general inapplicability of
the collateral source rule to Medicaid write-offs.  Part C provides an in-depth
analytical overview of the collateral source rule’s applicability or
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss3/9
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66. See Zorogastua, supra note 40, at 465.
67. Compare, e.g., Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 806 (Kan.
2003) (applying the collateral source rule to Medicare write-offs), and Brandon HMA, Inc. v.
Bradshaw, 2000-CA-00735-SCT (¶ 23) (Miss. 2001), 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (finding that
Medicaid benefits are subject to the collateral source rule), with Liberty v. Westwood United
Super, Inc., No. 89,143, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (per curiam)
(finding that the collateral source rule does not apply to Medicare write-offs), and Bozeman v.
State, 2003-1016, pp. 20-22 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 704-05 (holding that the collateral
source rule is not applicable to Medicaid write-offs).
68. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MEDICARE 5 (2009), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.pdf.
69. Id. at 4-5.
70. While this comment focuses mainly on whether the collateral source rule should apply
to services rendered under Medicaid and Medicare Part A, a brief sketch of Medicare’s other
components is useful.  As the Social Security Administration explains, “Part B . . . helps pay
for doctors’ services and many other medical services and supplies that are not covered by
hospital insurance,” while Part C provides for Medicare Advantage plans, which allow
individuals who already have Part A or B plans “to receive all of their health care services
through one of these provider organizations.”  Id. at 5.  Part D helps patients pay for prescription
drugs.  Id.
71. Id. at 4; see also Bozeman, at p. 21; 879 So. 2d at 705 (quoting Hodge v. Middletown
Hosp. Ass’n, 581 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ohio 1991)).
inapplicability to Medicare write-offs, discussing both the “benefit-of-the-
bargain theory” and the “reasonable value theory” and providing modern
critiques of each.  This section describes the different rationales in support of
each theory and contends that the collateral source rule should be inapplicable
to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs in Oklahoma, because this interpretation
better serves the state’s policy objective of making health care more
affordable.
A. An Introduction to Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs
Government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid have significantly
increased the complexity and difficulty of applying the collateral source rule.66
As a result, courts in different states are split over whether Medicare and
Medicaid write-offs are subject to the collateral source rule and, if so, how the
rule applies.67
Although often thought of as the same, Medicare and Medicaid are two
separate and distinct programs.68  Medicare is the “country’s health insurance
program” for those sixty-five years of age and older and is broken up into four
different Parts: A, B, C, and D.69  Part A, the Part most relevant to this
comment,70 is the federal program, financed through payroll taxes, that pays
hospital bills and other medical benefits for those meeting the eligibility
requirements.71  The program covers “the costs of hospital, related post-
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72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006).
73. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 68, at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006) (providing
the terms and conditions under which states may receive Medicaid funds from the federal
government). 
74. Okla. Health Care Auth., What is SoonerCare?, http://www.ohca.state.ok.us/indivi
duals.aspx?id=52 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
75. Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 172. 
76.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(n) (2006)
(Medicaid).  The regulations corresponding to these statutes may be found at 42 C.F.R. §
489.21(a) (2009) (Medicare) and 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2009) (Medicaid).
77. Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 172.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, pp. 20-22 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 704-05
(observing that “[s]everal courts have distinguished Medicaid benefits from Medicare and
private insurance” on the grounds that, unlike Medicare and private insurance beneficiaries,
Medicaid beneficiaries give no consideration for the services they receive); see also Russell G.
Thornton, Recovery of Medical Expenses in Texas, 20 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 315,
316 (2007) (asserting that “most jurisdictions hold that Medicaid/Medicare write-offs are not
a collateral source” and that “[i]n the context of Medicaid, most jurisdictions have found that
Medicaid write-offs are not an incurred expense”), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.
hospital, home health services, and hospice care.”72  Conversely, Medicaid is
a state-run program, funded in part by the federal government, “that provides
hospital and medical coverage for people with low income and little or no
resources.”73  In Oklahoma, the program is known as SoonerCare.74
While Medicare and Medicaid are distinguishable, they have one thing in
common for purposes of this comment: write-offs.  When a Medicare or
Medicaid patient receives medical services from a health-care provider, “the
provider must submit its bill to the corresponding agency for
reimbursement.”75  The provider, however, must accept as full payment the
actual amount the agency pays.76  This amount is typically less than a third of
what the provider originally billed.77  In other words, any portion of the
original bill remaining after payment by Medicare or Medicaid is
eliminated—that is, “written off”—by law, and the provider on average suffers
a greater than 67% reduction in the amount it receives compared with the
amount it billed.78  Yet despite this federally mandated write-off of any unpaid
portion of Medicare or Medicaid recipients’ medical bills, courts have reached
different conclusions regarding the collateral source rule’s applicability to such
write-offs and their recoverability as damages, as the next subsections
describe.
B. The Collateral Source Rule’s Inapplicability to Medicaid Write-Offs
As a general rule, courts do not apply the collateral source rule to Medicaid
write-offs,79 unlike the jurisdictional split found with respect to Medicare
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nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1906584&blobtype=pdf.  But see Brandon HMA, Inc. v.
Bradshaw, 2000-CA-00735-SCT (¶ 23) (Miss. 2001), 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (finding “no reason
why Medicaid benefits should be treated any differently than insurance payments, and [that]
they should be subject to the collateral source rule”).
80. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
81. Rebecca F. Anderson, Note, The Collateral Source Rule and Medicaid Plaintiffs:
Eliminating Windfalls and Double Recovery, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 223, 231 (2007).
82. See 33,242, p. 1 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/00); 759 So. 2d 1026, 1027.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at p. 2; 759 So. 2d at 1028.
86. Id.
87. See id. at pp. 2-3, 9; 759 So. 2d at 1028, 1031-32.
88. See id. at pp. 7-9; 759 So. 2d at 1028, 1030-31.
89. 2003-1016 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692.
write-offs.80  Despite silence by Oklahoma courts on the issue, a reasonable
interpretation of the state’s collateral source rule would not allow injured
plaintiffs to recover Medicaid write-offs.  This interpretation would be
consistent with most other jurisdictions, as described below.  Medicaid is
unlike most collateral sources because its “recipients do not pay for the
benefit” they are receiving,81 unlike private insurance owners and, arguably,
Medicare recipients.  As the following cases illustrate, courts emphasize this
differentiating factor when declining to apply the collateral source rule to
Medicaid write-offs.
In Terrell v. Nanda, Vernon Taylor required surgery after an automobile
accident.82  Eventually he required a second surgery, which was unsuccessful.83
Taylor subsequently suffered a series of debilitating complications and died
less than a year after his accident.84  Taylor’s medical bills totaled
$1,110,922.82, and Medicaid paid the health-care provider $164,084.82,
forcing the provider to write off the difference between the amounts pursuant
to Medicaid requirements.85  Mr. Taylor’s family, the plaintiffs in the case,
argued that they were entitled to recover the difference between the two
amounts and that the collateral source rule should apply to the portion written
off by the health-care provider.86  The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of
the write-offs.87  The plaintiffs could not recover the written-off portion of the
hospital’s bill because the payment to the hospital was “payment in full” under
federal law and because the Mr. Taylor did not incur the written-off portion as
damages.88
A similar situation arose in Bozeman v. State.89  Mr. Bozeman, a Medicaid
recipient, died as a result of a car accident, and his surviving spouse sued the
State of Louisiana for personal injuries suffered because of an allegedly unsafe
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90. See id. at pp. 2-3; 879 So. 2d at 694.
91. See id. at pp. 3-4; 879 So. 2d at 694-95.
92. See id.
93. See id. at p. 4; 879 So. 2d at 695.  
94. See id. at pp. 4-5; 879 So. 2d at 695.
95. Id. at 7; 879 So. 2d at 697.
96. Id. at p. 22; 879 So. 2d at 694, 705.
97. 980 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1997) (granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude
evidence of medical expenses in excess of amounts paid by Medicare).
98. Id. at 182.
99. Id. at 183-84.
100. Id. at 185.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 186.
road.90  Mrs. Bozeman sought to recover from the State the amount billed by
the health-care provider who treated her husband.91  The trial court initially
applied the collateral source rule, awarding Mrs. Bozeman damages that
included amounts written off by Medicaid.92  The court of appeals reversed on
that issue, citing Terrel, which it had decided in the interim between the
Bozeman trial and initial appeal.93  On remand, the trial court thus excluded the
written-off portion, and the court of appeals affirmed with minor
adjustments.94  The plaintiff subsequently applied for and was granted a writ
of certiorari by the Louisiana Supreme Court.95  In upholding the intermediate
appellate court, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Medicaid recipients
like Mr. Bozeman are not eligible to collect the written-off portion of a
hospital’s medical bill because they give no consideration for the free medical
services they receive.96
A federal district court in Virginia addressed an identical situation in
McAmis v. Wallace.97  There, the plaintiff received Medicaid, and the
defendant filed a motion in limine to limit the amount of recoverable damages
to only the fees paid by Medicaid as opposed to the entire amount billed.98
Applying Virginia law, the district court ruled that the collateral source rule
did not apply because the plaintiff was never responsible for making any
payment on the portion of the bill subject to write-off, nor did anyone—i.e.,
a third-party collateral source—actually pay such portion.99  The court relied
on the policy rationale that it was unfair to grant the plaintiff a windfall at the
expense of taxpayers who funded the plaintiff’s medical care.100  The district
court reasoned that “[i]n order to make Plaintiff whole, to reimburse her for
costs expended as a result of this accident, Plaintiff need only receive the
actual costs of medical care borne by Medicaid.”101  The court therefore
granted the defendant’s motion in limine, holding that the injured plaintiff was
not entitled to recover the written-off portion of the medical bills.102
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103. 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of
May 15, 1997, ch. 173, § 11, 1997 Kan. Sess. Laws 1191, 1204-09 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-226), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 P.3d 432, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. at 251-52. 
105. See id. at 251.
106. Id. at 252.
107. See id. at 253.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708, 719
(M.D.N.C. 1976)).
110. See Zorogastua, supra note 40, at 471.
A Kansas appellate court maintained the same line of reasoning in Bates v.
Hogg.103  In Bates, defendant Hogg’s pickup truck struck Bates from behind,
causing Bates to suffer various injuries.104  Hogg attempted to limit the
evidence of damages to the amount Medicaid actually paid instead of the
amount the hospital billed.105  Though Bates argued that the lower court’s
decision to exclude evidence of what the hospital billed violated the collateral
source rule,106 the appellate court upheld the exclusion.107  The court reasoned
that a health-care provider, because of its contract with Medicaid, may not
seek to recover any amount in excess of the amount paid by Medicaid;
consequently, the amount allowable under Medicaid constitutes the actual
amount charged.108  The court further reasoned that “[i]t would be
unconscionable to permit the taxpayers to bear the expense of providing free
medical care to a person and then allow that person to recover damages for
medical services from a tort-feasor and pocket the windfall.”109
The issue of whether the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid write-
offs is of little contention.  A strict interpretation of the collateral source rule
demonstrates that the rule only applies to payments, and write-offs do not
constitute payments.  Furthermore, this interpretation is supported by the
rationale that no consideration has been given for the medical benefits received
by Medicaid plaintiffs, and to allow them to recover double would be
unconscionable.  For these reasons, Oklahoma courts should reach the same
conclusion as did the courts mentioned above with regard to Medicaid write-
offs.  It should follow the general consensus and find that the collateral source
rule is inapplicable to such write-offs.
C. The Collateral Source Rule’s Applicability to Medicare Write-Offs
Courts are fairly consistent in not applying the collateral source rule to
Medicaid write-offs, but there is not a consistent approach among jurisdictions
in applying the rule to Medicare write-offs.110  Although Oklahoma courts
have never addressed this specific issue, examining other jurisdictions’
applications of the rule should help Oklahoma craft a reasonable solution.
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111. See, e.g., Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 806 (Kan. 2003);
Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, pp. 18-19 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 703-04.
112. Bozeman, at p. 18; 879 So. 2d at 703.
113. Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 175.
114. See Bozeman, at pp. 15-22; 879 So. 2d at 701-05 (citing, inter alia, Rose I, 78 P.3d 798;
Hodge v. Middletown Hosp. Ass’n, 581 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1991)).  Though Bozeman did not
involve a Medicare recipient, the court examined different approaches to applying the collateral
source rule and chose to apply the benefit-of-the-bargain theory.  Id. at pp. 14-22; 879 So. 2d
at 701-06.  The court stated that Medicare and Medicaid should only be treated similarly “in
those instances[] where plaintiff’s patrimony has been diminished in some way in order to
obtain the collateral source benefits.”  Id. at p. 22; 879 So. 2d at 706.  In such a case, the
“plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, and may recover the full value of his medical
services, including the ‘write-off’ amount.”  Id. 
115. See, e.g., Hodge, 581 N.E.2d at 532.  
116. See, e.g., id.
117. See id. 
Accordingly, this subsection evaluates two general approaches to the rule’s
application to Medicare write-offs in an effort to determine an appropriate
solution: (1) the benefit-of-the-bargain theory and (2) the reasonable value
theory.  This comment proposes that Oklahoma should adopt the variant of the
reasonable value theory that measures damages by the amount paid.
1. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Theory
Several cases posit that because Medicare recipients pay some consideration
for health-care coverage through their payroll taxes, in effect they bargain for
the benefits of the coverage.111  Courts utilizing this reasoning allow a plaintiff
to receive the entire value of her medical costs, including the amount written
off by mandate of federal law.112  They reason that “the contractual
adjustments under Medicare . . . [are] simply a bargained-for benefit akin to
a discount in price, which one might receive from a private insurance
carrier.”113  These courts liken Medicare payments to private insurance
payments, which have historically been subject to the collateral source rule.114
This reasoning also allows courts to distinguish Medicaid patients from
Medicare patients.  Sometimes defendants involved in a suit by a Medicare
patient will cite case precedent that involves a Medicaid patient in order to
argue that the write-offs are not subject to the collateral source rule.115
Although both programs’ write-offs should be treated the same—that is, the
collateral source rule simply should not apply to the write-offs of either
program—most courts reject these defendants’ arguments.116
For instance, in Hodge v. Middletown Hospital Ass’n, the Ohio Supreme
Court distinguished between Medicaid and Medicare.117  Though the plaintiff
received Medicare, the defendant relied on precedent involving other plaintiffs
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118. Id. at 531, 532.
119. Id. at 532.
120. Id. at 533.
121. See 78 P.3d 798, 800 (Kan. 2003).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 800, 802.
125. 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of
May 15, 1997, ch. 173, § 11, 1997 Kan. Sess. Laws 1191, 1204-09 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-226), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 P.3d 432, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); see also
text accompanying notes 103-09.
126. Rose I, 78 P.3d at 802; see also Bates, 921 P.2d at 253.
127. Rose I, 78 P.3d at 803, 806.
128. Id. at 802-03.
129. See id. at 806.
who received Medicaid.118  In rejecting the defendant’s argument and
distinguishing between Medicare and Medicaid, the court explained that
“Medicaid is a system for providing payment of medical costs for the poor.
Neither the beneficiary nor his employer pays premiums or underwrites the
cost of the program.”119  The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate
court’s affirmation of a reduction to the plaintiff’s award, determining that
Medicare benefits qualify as insurance under federal law such that the
collateral source rule applies.120
In Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc. (Rose I), the Kansas Supreme
Court used similar reasoning when addressing a claim on behalf of Lyle Rose,
who, while a patient at Via Christi’s St. Francis Hospital, fell from his bed,
suffered severe trauma to his head, and ultimately died from a subdural
hematoma.121  Despite the health-care provider’s attempt to prevent the
introduction of evidence of the amount billed, the trial court applied the
collateral source rule and permitted the evidence to come in.122  Nevertheless,
the trial court allowed the jury’s damage award to be offset postverdict.123
Rose’s estate appealed the reduction of the award, and the health-care provider
cross-appealed the collateral source ruling.124
On appeal, the health-care provider relied on existing Kansas precedent,
namely, Bates v. Hogg,125 which held that a Medicaid recipient may only
recover the amount actually paid and not the amount billed.126  Despite this
argument, the Rose I court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the
collateral source rule applies to Medicare write-offs.127  In declining to apply
Bates to the case, the court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that “Medicare
benefits are purchased by payroll deductions and Medicaid benefits are free to
all who qualify.”128  The court reasoned that, unlike Medicaid patients,
Medicare patients provide some consideration for the benefits they receive.129
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130. Id. at 805-06 (citing, inter alia, Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003)).
131. Id. at 806.
132. See, e.g., Simpson v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., No. 07-CV-0157-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL
3388739, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2008); Lindholm v. Hassan, 2005 DSD 11 ¶ 10 & n.5, 369
F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108 & n.5; Papke v. Harbert, 2007 SD 87, ¶ 69, 738 N.W.2d 510, 532.
133. See Rose I, 78 P.3d at 800.
134. See Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 248 (Kan. 2005).
135. See ,e.g., cases cited supra note 132.
136. Rose II, 113 P.3d at 248 (emphasis added).
137. See Natalie J. Kussart, Note, Paid Bills v. Charged Bills: Insurance and the Collateral
Source Rule Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (2005), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 157-58 (2006).
Therefore, because an injured party with private insurance may seek to recover
any portion written off under a contract agreement, an injured party with
Medicare insurance, “akin to private insurance,” may also seek to recover the
portion written off by operation of federal law.130  Additionally, “[b]ecause
health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare in the same manner
as they contract with other private insurers for reduced rates, the benefit of the
write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather than the
health care provider.”131
Although various courts cite the Kansas Supreme Court’s reasoning to
justify categorical application of the collateral source rule to Medicare write-
offs,132 such reliance is misplaced, because the billing hospital in the Rose
cases was also the tortfeasor.133  In fact, after an initial remand, the court
explicitly found that the Medicare write-off could not be treated as a collateral
source, given that (1) neither the plaintiff nor a third party paid the written-off
portion, and (2) the write-off “reflected a cost incurred by the defendant” as
the medical care provider.134  Although other jurisdictions have continued to
cite Rose I to support holdings in other tort cases,135 the Kansas Supreme Court
emphasized in the Rose II decision that because the defendant was also the
health-care provider, it did “not reach the broader issue of whether Medicare
or a Medicare write off, when the services are provided by a health care
provider that is not a defendant, is a collateral source.”136  Thus, Rose I is
ultimately a very narrow decision that applies only when the tortfeasor is also
the billing hospital.  To use the Rose I holding to support something broader
is erroneous.  The Rose cases left open the possibility for later Kansas courts
to reach more reasonable conclusions about the inapplicability of the collateral
source rule to Medicare write-offs.
The decisions discussed above increase the difficulty of discerning whether
the collateral source rule should apply to Medicare write-offs.137  Instead of
developing a consistent, reasoned approach regarding whether the rule applies,
these decisions inject a seemingly illogical and unnecessary factor that must
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138. See, e.g., Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, pp. 20-22 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 705-06.
139. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (9th ed. 2009).
140. Midcoast Aviation, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 907 F.2d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 1990).
141. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 68, at 4.
142. McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F. Supp. 181, 186 (W.D. Va. 1997) (granting defendant’s
motion in limine to exclude medical expenses subject to Medicaid write-off).
143. Id.; see also Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 177 (pointing out that, like Medicaid,
Medicare is partially funded through FICA taxes).
144. See Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 177.
145. See Kussart, supra note 137, at 157-58.
146. See Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 175.
147. See id.
148. See id.; see also supra note 37.
149. Private health-care insurers often negotiate with health-care providers to secure write-
offs for the insurers’ clients.  See Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974, 985 (D.C. 2003). Some
courts deem these write-offs subject to the collateral source rule because they represent a benefit
of the agreement between the patient and her health-care insurer.  See, e.g., id. at 984-85.  Using
the same reasoning, some courts further conclude that if a plaintiff’s contract with her insurer
be dealt with by the courts—a determination of whether the write-off was
bargained for.138
It is illogical to argue that Medicare beneficiaries bargain for their benefits.
A bargain is “[a]n agreement between parties for the exchange of promises or
performances,” much like a contract.139  A true contract requires an offer,
consideration, and voluntary acceptance.140  Medicare receives much of its
funding from payroll taxes.141  Mandatory payroll taxes hardly qualify as a
voluntary acceptance necessary for contract formation.  A “[p]laintiff simply
[does] not bargain for Medicaid [or Medicare] the way a party purchasing
health insurance or working for the government bargains for benefits.”142
“Someone who merely pays her FICA taxes does not in any sense bargain for
the lower fees paid . . . .”143
Additionally, since neither Medicare nor Medicaid benefits are bargained
for, distinguishing between the programs on the basis of a bargain theory is
flawed and unnecessary.144  Both Medicare and Medicaid are government
programs, and neither is freely contracted for—participation in both is
involuntarily.145
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to equate Medicare with private insurance,
because doing so grants an injured Medicare patient an unnecessary
windfall.146  An injured patient with private insurance may invoke “the
protection of the collateral source rule” and recover all amounts paid and
written off as damages from the tortfeasor.147  Nevertheless, because of the
right of subrogation, the private insurance company may recoup the amount
the injured patient recovered from the tortfeasor.148  This makes the injured
patient, in theory, whole again—no more, no less.149  Conversely, if an injured
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does not provide for subrogation, see supra note 37, the lack of such a provision likewise
constitutes a benefit of the plaintiff’s bargain with her insurer, thus entitling the plaintiff to
recover damages for the amounts written off pursuant to her insurer’s negotiations with her
health-care provider.  See Hardi, 818 A.2d at 984 (holding that the collateral source rule is
“applicable when . . . the plaintiff may be said to have contracted for the prospect of a double
recovery” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451
A.2d 867, 873 (D.C. 1982))).
150. See Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 247-48.
151. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.21(a) (2009).
152. See Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 175.
153. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.21(a); Olson & Wasson, supra note 10, at 172.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 cmt. h (1979).
patient with Medicare is permitted to recover the amount written off by the
health-care provider, he or she will receive a windfall.  This is due to the fact
that even though Medicare may exercise a right of subrogation with respect to
amounts actually paid to the health-care provider,150 federal law prohibits
health-care providers—and presumably Medicare itself—from seeking the
portion written off by the health-care provider.151  “[T]here is no right of
subrogation or refund of benefits on a tort recovery for the amount written-off
under Medicare . . . .”152  Thus, while health-care providers must accept
Medicare payments as payment in full,153 the injured Medicare patient receives
an amount akin to punitive damages if permitted to keep a damage award that
includes the written-off portion of a medical bill.  This effect marks a crucial
difference between Medicare and private insurance.
All of the deficiencies in the benefit-of-the-bargain theory have led a
majority of courts to use the reasonable value theory.  Oklahoma courts should
follow this majority approach.
2. The Reasonable Value Theory
Many courts adopt the reasonable value theory, but they apply it in an
inconsistent manner.  Proponents of this theory often cite a portion of
comment h to section 911 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides:
When the plaintiff seeks to recover for expenditures made or
liability incurred to third persons for services rendered, normally
the amount recovered is the reasonable value of the services rather
than the amount paid or charged.  If, however, the injured person
paid less than the exchange rate, he can recover no more than the




155. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. Staton, No. CIV.A.01-2418-CM, 2002 WL 922137, at *7-8
(D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2002); Suhor v. Lagasse, 2000-1628, pp. 8-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/13/00); 770
So. 2d 422, 427; Terrell v. Nanda, 33-242, pp. 7-9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/00); 759 So. 2d 1026,
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grounds by Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333 (Pa. 2008); cf. Dyet v.
McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2003) (affirming the trial court’s decision to allow the
jury to consider pre-write-off medical expenses, but also affirming the trial court’s reduction
of the jury’s award by the write-off amount).
156. See, e.g., Lindholm v. Hassan, 2005 DSD 11 ¶¶ 7-15, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107-
1110; Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1160 (Haw. 2004); Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018,
1034 (Ill. 2008); Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 683-84 (Ky. 2005).
157. See, e.g., Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293, 294-95 (S.C. 2003); Lagerstrom v. Myrtle
Werth Hosp.-Mayo Health Sys., 2005 WI 124, ¶ 74, 285 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 74, 700 N.W.2d 201, ¶
74.
158. See, e.g., Moorhead, 765 A.2d at 789; Hanif v. Hous. Auth. of Yolo County, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 192, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
Under this theory, an injured plaintiff who was a Medicare recipient, or a
Medicaid recipient, arguably would pay less than the exchange rate for the
actual medical services he received.  Therefore, the plaintiff should not be able
to recover more than the amount paid—i.e., he should only be able to recover
the amount Medicare actually paid to the health-care provider.  While this
appears to be a straightforward interpretation of the collateral source rule, not
all courts have embraced such an interpretation.
Under the reasonable value theory, three main approaches have developed.
First, some courts have defined the reasonable value a Medicare recipient can
receive as the amount actually paid by Medicare.155  Second, other courts have
determined that the reasonable value should be measured by the amount
actually charged by the health-care provider.156  Lastly, a few courts allow the
fact-finder to hear evidence of both the amount paid and the amount billed and
use this evidence to determine the reasonable value of the medical services.157
These three approaches result in disagreement over whether to apply the
collateral source rule to Medicare write-offs; however, only the first
consistently leads to a logical and fair outcome.  Therefore, Oklahoma should
adopt the first of these approaches.
(a) Amount Paid
Some courts have found that the reasonable value of recovery should be
determined by the amount paid.  This approach actually encompasses two
different jurisprudential methods that reach the same result.  One method
defines the reasonable value of services as the amount actually paid, thus
allowing the jury to hear evidence of the amount written off by Medicare.158
The second method differs slightly.  Courts accept that the collateral source
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
606 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:585
159. See, e.g., Simpson v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., No. 07-CV-0157-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL
3388739, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2008).
160. See, e.g., Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239; Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of W. Mich., 740 N.Y.S.2d 167,
167 (App. Div. 2002).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979) (emphasis added).
162. See 765 A.2d 786.
163. Id. at 787.
164. Id. at 788.
165. Id. at 789.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 788, 790-91.
rule excludes evidence of what Medicare actually paid unless the collateral
source rule has been modified or abrogated.159  Some courts, however, go
further and interpret the language of the collateral source rule strictly and find
that the rule simply does not apply to write-offs, because write-offs are not
“payments.”160  The distinction between these two methods is purely academic
because, as a practical matter, the result is the same for each method.  Because
both methods essentially consider the reasonable value recoverable by a
plaintiff to be the amount actually paid by Medicare, this comment considers
them the same.
The general premise, as well as the most compelling and simple
explanation, for limiting the amount recoverable to the amount actually paid
is that the collateral source rule simply does not apply to write-offs.  The
common law iteration of the collateral source rule provides that “[p]ayments
made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not
credited against the tortfeasor’s liability.”161  By definition, Medicare, and even
Medicaid, write-offs are not payments at all.  The case of Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Medical Center illustrates this concept.162  In Moorhead, the decedent,
a Medicare recipient, was injured as a result of a fall at the appellee’s medical
center.163  Her medical bills totaled $108,668.31, but because she was a
Medicare recipient, the health-care provider received $12,167.40 as payment
in full, leaving the provider to write off $96,500.91.164  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that the decedent’s estate could sue for the
reasonable value of her hospital expenses.165  The only question for the court
was how to calculate that reasonable value.166  Affirming both the trial and
appellate courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the collateral
source rule did not apply to the $96,500.91 that was written off by the health-
care provider.167  In support of its conclusion that the amount paid by the
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[T]he essential point to recognize is that Appellee is not seeking to
diminish Appellant’s recovery by [the amount actually paid by
Medicare].  Rather, the issue is whether Appellant is entitled to
collect the additional amount of $96,500.91 as an expense.
Appellant did not pay $96,500.91, nor did Medicare . . . pay that
amount on her behalf.  The collateral source rule does not apply to
the illusory “charge” of $96,500.91 since that amount was not paid
by any collateral source.168
The court concluded that allowing the appellant to recover the $96,500.91
would amount to a windfall profit for the plaintiff and would contradict the
idea of fair compensation.169
Other jurisdictions have reasoned similarly.  In Hanif v. Housing Authority
of Yolo County, a personal injury suit arose when the plaintiff was struck by
an automobile while on the defendant’s property.170  The California Court of
Appeals addressed the question “whether the ‘reasonable value’ measure of
recovery means that an injured plaintiff may recover from the tortfeasor more
than the actual amount he paid or for which he incurred liability for past
medical care and services.”171  The trial court, relying in part on the principle
that tort damages are meant to restore an injured plaintiff to his former
position,172 as well as California’s bar against double recovery,173 had held that
the reasonable value of recovery equaled the actual amount paid by Medi-
Cal,174 California’s form of Medicare.  The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision finding the defendant negligent but lowered the recoverable
damages to the amount paid by Medi-Cal.175
Similarly, a Kansas appellate court addressed a slip-and-fall scenario similar
to the hypothetical in Part II.176  In Liberty v. Westwood United Super, Inc., the
plaintiff slipped and fell while in the defendant’s grocery store; she sustained
injuries and later filed suit.177  The plaintiff lost at trial and was denied a new
trial.178  She subsequently appealed, contending in part that the trial court erred
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by disallowing evidence of Medicare write-offs that she believed were
recoverable damages.179  The court held that the collateral source rule did not
apply to Medicare write-offs, observing that applying the rule in such a context
would “require[] a great deal of creativity.”180  Instead of applying the
collateral source rule, the court calculated the reasonable value of the
plaintiff’s personal injuries.181  The court concluded that the reasonable value
of the plaintiff’s injuries was equal to the customary charge allowed by
Medicare.182  Relying on its earlier decision in Bates v. Hogg,183 the court
found that because any health-care provider was contractually prohibited from
charging the plaintiff for the portion of her bills written off by Medicare, the
amount due from Medicare was the customary charge;184 thus, the amount paid
by Medicare constituted the reasonable value.185
The Idaho Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Dyet v. McKinley,
wherein Dyet, traveling in a car, collided into McKinley as McKinley
attempted to make a left-hand turn in front of Dyet.186  The crash caused Dyet
to require a number of surgeries, with her resulting medical bills totaling
$89,367.71.187  Dyet was on Medicare, and the hospital received $21,712.49
as payment in full for Dyet’s medical bills, forcing it to write off $67,655.22
as required by law.188  At trial, the court granted Dyet’s motion in limine and
permitted her to exclude from evidence the fact that she had received payment
assistance from any collateral sources, including Medicare.189  Nevertheless,
the trial court reduced her damages award by the exact amount written off by
Medicare.190  The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision turned on whether Medicare
write-offs could be treated as a collateral source under Idaho law.191  The court
followed justifications set forth in the New York case of Kastick v. U-Haul Co.
of Western Michigan and held that because “the write-off technically [was] not
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a payment from a collateral source within the meaning of [the collateral source
statute], it [was] not an item of damages for which plaintiff [might] recover
because plaintiff ha[d] incurred no liability therefore [sic].”192
The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas in Wildermuth v. Staton
articulated perhaps the most straightforward reasoning for not allowing injured
plaintiffs to recover the amount written off by Medicare under the collateral
source rule.193  Wildermuth and several other plaintiffs were involved in a
motor vehicle accident and claimed that they had incurred physical injuries
because of the negligent driving of Staton.194  Medicare paid part of the health-
care expenses for some of the plaintiffs, and because of the agreement between
these plaintiffs’ health-care providers and Medicare, the providers wrote off
the unpaid portion of the expenses.195  The main issue before the district court
was “whether Plaintiffs [might] introduce evidence of the full amount of their
medical expenses even though their health care providers wrote off a portion
of the charges pursuant to their agreements with Medicare.”196  The plaintiffs
contended that limiting the amount of damages recoverable from Staton
violated Kansas’s collateral source rule.197  The court disagreed.198  
The district court divided its decision into two main parts.  First, the court
determined that Medicare beneficiaries do not “bargain for” Medicare write-
offs in the same sense that beneficiaries of private insurance might be said to
“bargain for” write-offs when they purchase private insurance.199  Instead, the
court observed, Medicare “write-offs are required by operation of federal law,
and Medicare providers are prohibited under Medicare law and regulations
from seeking reimbursement of the written-off amounts from any source.”200
In other words, federal law “simply extinguishe[s]” the difference between the
amount billed by the health-care provider and the amount paid by Medicare.201
Second, the court determined that there is no need for a distinction between
Medicare and Medicaid, because “[w]hat is it [sic] at issue is the write-off and
not the Medicare payment itself.”202  The distinction between the programs is
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irrelevant, because the collateral source rule applies only to “evidence of
benefits paid by a collateral source”;203 thus, by its very language, the rule does
not apply to expenses never paid.204
Additionally, the district court looked at the policy implications of allowing
an injured plaintiff to recover the written-off portion of a medical bill.205
Although the collateral source rule is meant to prevent a tortfeasor from
escaping full liability and receiving a windfall, the court noted that the rule “is
not intended to provide a windfall to plaintiffs.”206  In fact, using the language
of the Kansas Supreme Court, the court concluded that “the basic principle of
damages is to make a party whole by putting it back in the same position, not
to grant a windfall.”207  This case depicts the type of reasoning that Oklahoma
courts should adopt in their interpretation of Oklahoma’s collateral source
rule.208
In Maurer v. Iehl, a federal district court in Indiana applied reasoning
similar to that in Wildermuth v. Staton.209  Like Wildermuth, Maurer attempted
to increase her possible recoverable damages by filing a motion in limine to
prevent the defendants from entering any evidence regarding Medicare write-
offs.210  Maurer argued that the collateral source rule covered write-offs and
that evidence concerning the write-offs was therefore inadmissible and could
not lower her recoverable damages.211  Judge Springmann noted that Indiana’s
legislature had abrogated the common law collateral source rule and that
evidence of collateral source payments was now allowed unless the payments
fell into a statutory exception.212  The court mentioned that part of the stated
purpose behind Indiana’s new collateral source rule was to limit injured
plaintiffs to one recovery.213  Judge Springmann held that because Maurer did
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Letourneau, a recipient of private insurance, was entitled to recover the amount originally billed
despite the fact that a portion of the bill was written-off.  See id. at 321-23.  The court justified
its decision on the policy rationale that
[t]he collateral source rule is designed to strike a balance between two competing
principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to make
him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that
proximately result from his wrong.  A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for
a single tort enjoys a windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part,
liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall.  Because the law must sanction one
windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the
wrongdoer.
Id. at 323 (quoting Schickling v. Aspinall, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1988)).  In other words,
the court relied on the traditional justifications for double recovery to hold that the reasonable
value of recoverable damages equates to the amount billed.
not establish that Medicare write-offs fell into one of the statutory exceptions,
the evidence of the write-offs would be allowed.214
The foregoing cases illustrate the reasoning employed by those jurisdictions
that hold that the reasonable value of recovery for an injured plaintiff includes
only the amount paid by Medicare rather than the full amount billed by the
health-care provider.  Courts following this approach have often reasoned that
the language of the collateral source rule simply does not encompass Medicare
write-offs.  The common law rule specifically prohibits evidence of payments
by a collateral source.215  Because 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(A) federally
mandates that the portion of medical bills not paid by Medicare be written off,
the portion written off, by definition, does not constitute a payment.  In light
of the sound logical reasoning and justifications illustrated in the decisions
discussed above, Oklahoma should follow suit and adopt this interpretation of
the collateral source rule with regard to Medicare write-offs.
(b) Amount Billed
Another portion of the states embracing the reasonable value theory hold the
reasonable value equivalent to the amount billed by the health-care provider,
including the portion written off after payment by Medicare.  Courts have
varied in the justifications offered in support of this position, as the following
discussion demonstrates.216
In Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, Kentucky’s supreme court
addressed the issue of whether reasonable value equals the amount billed,
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including the amount of Medicare write-offs.217  In this medical malpractice
suit, Baptist Healthcare argued on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing
Miller, the injured plaintiff, to recover the portion of the medical expenses
written off by Medicare.218  The Kentucky Supreme Court discussed the
common law collateral source rule, which Kentucky has long followed, and
held that Medicare benefits fall subject to the rule, similar to other medical
insurance benefits.219  Despite Baptist’s argument that a Medicare write-off
creates no obligation to pay and thus does not constitute a payment under the
collateral source rule,220 the court determined otherwise.221  The court held that
the tortfeasor’s “duty to pay the reasonable value” of the medical expenses
does not go away when the health-care provider contracts with Medicare to
accept payments lower than the billed rates.222
The Illinois Supreme Court followed suit in Wills v. Foster, where Wills
filed a complaint against Foster for personal injures arising out of an
automobile accident.223  The case presented the issue of whether the award of
medical expenses was limited to the amount paid by Medicaid and Medicare
or whether Wills could recover the amount billed.224  Wills’s bills from the
accident totaled $80,163.47; however, Medicare paid only $19,005.50.225
After a trial, the jury awarded Wills the entire amount originally billed, but the
trial court granted the defendant’s motion to reduce this award, and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed the reduction.226  On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court determined that Illinois follows the reasonable value approach
and concluded that the reasonable value equates to the amount billed.227
Specifically, it reasoned that “[a]llowing evidence of both the billed and
discounted amounts compromises the collateral source rule, confuses the jury,
and potentially prejudices both parties in the case.”228  Under Illinois law, the
collateral source rule “prevent[s] the jury from learning anything about
collateral income.”229  As a result of the court’s reasoning, defendants in
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Illinois may not enter evidence of Medicare write-offs in an attempt to lower
injured plaintiffs’ recoverable damages.230
Although reaching a similar conclusion, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
proffered a different rationale for equating the reasonable value of medical
services to the amount actually billed in Bynum v. Magno.231  While
vacationing in Hawaii, Bynum experienced chest pains, sought treatment at a
local hospital, and ultimately received care from Dr. Magno following a
transfer to another hospital.232  Even though Dr. Magno was aware of Bynum’s
history of respiratory failure, she allowed him to undergo bypass surgery, a
particularly risky procedure for a patient in his position.233  During the surgery,
Bynum suffered respiratory problems and, consequently, became permanently
dependent on a ventilation machine.234  Bynum was a Medicare and Medi-Cal
(California’s Medicaid) recipient.235  His family sued on his behalf for the
amount equivalent to the standard charges for the services the health-care
facility and doctors provided him.236
The Bynums filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii,
where they received a judgment that included the entire amount billed by Dr.
Magno.237  Dr. Magno appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.238  Following the Ninth
Circuit’s guidance, the district court determined in a new trial that the question
of how to correctly measure the damages the Bynums were entitled to receive
was better suited for the Hawaii Supreme Court.239  The district court therefore
certified to the Hawaii Supreme Court the question whether the discounted
amount (i.e., the amount paid) or the amount billed represented the amount
Bynum’s family was entitled to recover.240
The state court acknowledged that some cases hold the collateral source rule
inapplicable to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, but found the rationales of
those cases unpersuasive given that the collateral source rule “applies to both
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
614 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:585
241. See id. at 1155.
242. Id. (“[T]he fact that the doctor did not charge for his services . . . does not prevent [the
plaintiff’s] recovery for the reasonable value of the services.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c(3) (1979))).
243. Id. at 1156.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c(4)).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1157.
249. Pipkins v. TA Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (D.N.M. 2006) (denying
defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of billed amounts subject to Medicare write-
off).
250. Id. at 1256-57.
gratuities and social legislation benefits.”241  The court first noted that the
collateral source rule applies to situations involving gratuitous services.242  The
court found that “because a plaintiff would be able to recover the ‘reasonable
value’ of medical services if such services were rendered gratuitously, it would
appear to follow that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover the ‘reasonable
value’ of such services, even if Medicare/Medicaid had already paid a . . .
discounted amount.”243  Consequently, the court concluded that the portion
written off by the health-care provider could be viewed as gratuitous.244
The court also noted that the collateral source rule applies to “certain ‘types’
of benefits such as social legislation benefits.”245  The court cited the second
Restatement, observing that “social security benefits, welfare payments, [and]
pensions under special retirement acts” are subject to the rule.246  Ultimately,
the court reasoned that Medicare and Medicaid payments are social legislation
benefits247 and thus subject to the collateral source rule, preventing the
Bynums’ damages award from being reduced by the portion of Dr. Magno’s
bills that was written off.248
Similarly, a New Mexico federal court interpreted New Mexico law as
requiring that the amount of a Medicare write-off be viewed “as a benefit or
contribution received by the plaintiff from a source collateral to the
tortfeasor.”249  In Pipkins v. TA Operating Corp., the defendant conceded that
the collateral source rule could not reduce the amount plaintiffs were entitled
to recover for wrongdoing; nevertheless, it argued that the rule did not apply
to Medicare write-offs and sought to exclude both evidence of and recovery
of the written-off portion of the bill through a motion in limine.250  In its
analysis, the district court treated Medicare write-offs as similar to gratuitous
medical services for which a plaintiff has no financial liability; yet because the
injured plaintiff received a benefit, the court held that the collateral source rule
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still applied.251  The court supported its conclusion by reiterating New
Mexico’s policy that if one party is to receive a windfall, it is better that it be
the injured party rather than the tortfeasor.252  Thus, the court denied the
defendant’s motion.253
In Lindholm v. Hassan, the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Dakota encountered a situation similar to that in Bynum and Pipkins, and
reached the same conclusion.254  In this medical malpractice action, Dr. Hassan
sought to keep Lindholm from entering evidence of the amount billed for
medical services,255 reasoning that amounts actually paid by Medicare—that
is, amounts remaining after the operation of federally mandated write-
offs—best reflect the reasonable value of services rendered.256  The district
court, however, found the mandatory nature of write-offs irrelevant to the
analysis.257  Instead, the court took the position that these write-offs are
virtually identical to gratuitous services or social legislation benefits; thus,
Lindholm was entitled not only to the amount actually paid on his behalf but
also to the reasonable value of the medical services provided.258  This value
would be determined by a jury presented with evidence of the amount billed
but not the amount written off.259
The foregoing cases stand in direct opposition to the cases discussed in Part
III.C.2.a.  They underscore the traditional policy rationales for the collateral
source rule’s existence by advancing the idea that if one of the two parties
must obtain a windfall, the injured, or non-negligent, party should be the one
to receive it rather than the tortfeasor.  Many of these cases did not distinguish
between Medicaid and Medicare write-offs, instead considering them the
same.
Additionally, some courts tried to force Medicare write-offs into one of the
types of benefits discussed in the Restatement—gratuitous services or social
legislation benefits—an effort which is tantamount to attempting to fit a square
peg into a round hole.  These courts’ characterization of Medicare write-offs
as a form of gratuitous health-care service is nonsensical.  Gifts, by definition,
are “voluntary transfer[s] of property to another without compensation.”260
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The opposite is true of Medicare write-offs.  Medicare write-offs occur
because federal law mandates that they occur.261  Mandating that health-care
providers write off a portion of a Medicare recipient’s medical bill means,
almost by definition, that the health-care services are not gratuitous.  To label
mandatory write-offs as voluntary gifts is oxymoronic.
Furthermore, while it may be fair to call Medicare or Medicaid payments
social legislation benefits, the same does not hold true for Medicare and
Medicaid write-offs.  The fact that some courts conflate write-offs with
payments only creates more difficulty in deciding whether to apply the
collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.
Although most courts use the amount billed or the amount paid to determine
reasonable value, a few leave the reasonableness determination to the fact-
finder, as the next subsection discusses.
(c) Fact-Finder’s Prerogative
A minority of courts allow the jury to hear evidence of both the amount
billed by the health-care provider and the amount paid by Medicare and allow
the jury determine what constitutes a reasonable value.262  Both the South
Carolina Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have recently used
this approach when calculating the reasonable value of damages for patients
with Medicare and Medicaid coverage.263
In Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hospital-Mayo Health System, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the state’s collateral
source rule allowed evidence of collateral source payments, including
Medicare benefits, in a medical malpractice suit.264  The eighty-seven-year-old
Lagerstrom fell and broke his hip, requiring him to be admitted to Myrtle
Werth Hospital.265  Following his hip-replacement surgery, doctors noticed that
Mr. Lagerstrom had lung congestion.266  At about the same time, doctors
decided to insert a feeding tube to make sure he was receiving the nutrients his
body required.267  The doctors misplaced the feeding tube, however, and
instead of pumping nutrients into Mr. Lagerstrom’s stomach, the tube pumped
nutrients into his left lung.268  Mr. Lagerstrom suffered multiple complications
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss3/9
2010] COMMENTS 617
269. See id. ¶¶ 13-14.
270. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15.
271. See id. ¶ 3.
272. See id. ¶¶ 1, 3-7.
273. Id. ¶ 27.
274. Id. ¶¶ 27, 57-58.
275. See 579 S.E.2d 293, 294 (S.C. 2003).  This case is discussed here rather than in Part
III.B, because it illustrates how some courts leave the determination of the reasonable value of
damages to jurors.  It should be noted that this case appears to represent a rather isolated
departure from the majority view that the collateral source rule is inapplicable to Medicaid
write-offs.  See discussion supra Part III.B.
276. Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 294.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 295.
as a result of this mistake and died of pneumonia within a couple of months.269
Lagerstrom’s representatives brought a wrongful death action against the
hospital in state court and received a favorable jury verdict,270 but the jury was
able to take collateral source payments into account when calculating damages
postverdict.271  The plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeals certified to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court the issue of the constitutionality of a Wisconsin
statute that modified the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases.272
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the collateral source payments
from Medicare and evidence of the write-offs were admissible under
Wisconsin’s collateral source rule.273  The court mentioned the traditional
policy rationale for the collateral source rule and stated that an award of
damages may not be reduced by collateral source payments, but the court
ultimately held that the jury could use evidence of all collateral source
payments in calculating the reasonable value of the health-care provider’s
services.274
Haselden v. Davis involved a similar medical malpractice suit, though the
patient in this case was covered by Medicaid, not Medicare.275  The defendant,
Davis, contended that the trial court should limit the amount of Haselden’s
recoverable damages to the amount actually paid by Medicaid;276 however, that
court allowed the jury to consider both the amount paid and the amount billed,
and the appellate court affirmed.277   The South Carolina Supreme Court
likewise affirmed the decision, explaining that “[a]lthough the amount paid
may be relevant in determining the reasonable value of . . . [medical] services,
the trier of fact must look to a variety of other factors in making such a
finding,” including “the amount billed to the plaintiff.”278  In other words, the
jury should be able to consider more than just the amount paid by Medicaid to
the health-care provider.  Accordingly, the court declined to limit the damages
to the amount paid by the health-care provider, because such a limitation
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would be “contrary to the purposes behind the collateral source rule,” and it
would potentially allow the tortfeasor to receive a windfall.279
These two cases reflect the reasoning of the minority of jurisdictions that
use the jury-prerogative form of the reasonable value approach.  While this
method seems rational because it allows the jury to hear all the evidence,
allowing both the billed amount and paid amount into court may actually
confuse the jury.280  This method also ignores the fact that Medicare and
Medicaid payments are not the same as Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, and
courts should not treat them as such.
These three approaches to calculating reasonable value represent different
rationales and attempts to find common ground between two competing
interests pertaining to recoverable damages: making the plaintiff whole versus
requiring a tortfeasor to be responsible for all damages.281  The amount paid
rationale rests on the notion that a plaintiff should recover only the amount
paid because the injured plaintiff has presumably already been made whole
through medical services, and anything extra moves further away from the tort
objective of merely making the plaintiff whole.  The amount billed rationale
emphasizes the traditional idea that a defendant should be responsible for all
of a plaintiff’s injuries, even if the plaintiff receives a windfall.  The jury-
prerogative method permits the jury to examine both Medicare and Medicaid
payments and Medicare and Medicaid write-offs to determine what is
reasonable in a particular instance.  Although Oklahoma can find precedent
and theoretical support for each of these methods, the state should determine
that the collateral source rule does not apply to Medicare and Medicaid write-
offs, limiting a plaintiff’s damages to the amount paid to the health-care
provider.
IV. The Inapplicability of Oklahoma’s Collateral Source Rule to Medicare
and Medicaid Write-Offs
Though several jurisdictions apply the collateral source rule to Medicare
and Medicaid write-offs, this comment contends that the collateral source rule
should not apply to these write-offs in Oklahoma.  While Oklahoma courts
have yet to decide this specific issue,282 Oklahoma’s new collateral source rule
and the state’s desire to bring down health-care costs indicate that the rule
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§ 920A(2) (1979), with 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 198 (1938).
should not apply to these write-offs.  Evidence of these write-offs should be
admissible in medical malpractice cases and, arguably, in other personal injury
cases as well.  This comment argues two points: (1) Medicare and Medicaid
write-offs do not fall subject to the collateral source rule in general; and (2)
Oklahoma’s new focus on decreasing health-care costs supports applying the
state’s new collateral source rule differently than its common law rule,
especially in medical liability cases.
Part A of this section discusses the traditional justifications for and
interpretations of Oklahoma’s collateral source rule in regard to Medicare and
Medicaid write-offs.  Part B discusses how statutory interpretation of the
collateral source rule in Oklahoma does not bar the entrance of Medicare and
Medicaid write-offs into evidence, because these write-offs do not constitute
payments.  Alternatively, if Oklahoma courts decide that these write-offs do
fall subject to the collateral source rule, this comment contends that
Oklahoma’s collateral source rule allows write-offs to be entered into evidence
in medical liability cases and also in other personal injury cases, given the
prevailing policy rationales that undergird the new codification of the rule.
A. Oklahoma’s Traditional Collateral Source Rule and an Example of Its
Erroneous Application to Write-Offs
Oklahoma case precedent reflects a history of disallowing evidence of
collateral source payments in general.283  Oklahoma’s collateral source rule
originated in the supreme court’s interpretation of title 23, section 61 of the
Oklahoma Statutes in Denco Bus Lines,284 wherein the court cited a
formulation of the rule very similar to that set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.285  Using this definition, “Oklahoma decisions [have]
generally appl[ied] the collateral source rule broadly in favor of a plaintiff and
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exclude[d] evidence of an alternative or collateral source that would [have]
lessen[ed] a plaintiff’s damages.”286
Given Oklahoma courts’ historical refusal to admit evidence of collateral
source payments, it can be argued that these courts would reach the same result
when applying the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.
Though no Oklahoma state court has ever decided this issue, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma recently ruled on a motion in
limine in Simpson v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc.287 and barred the admission of a
Medicare write-off in a personal injury case.288  In that case, Simpson, a
Medicare recipient, sued Saks after a slip-and-fall incident.289  Saks filed a
motion in limine, arguing that “medical bills written off by providers to
accommodate Medicare’s payment schedule are not admissible to prove
damages, because no one paid the written-off amounts and no one ever will be
obligated to pay them.”290
Despite Saks’s argument, the district court held that Medicare payments are
a collateral source such that the collateral source rule applies to them and the
portions of medical bills written off.291  In reaching its conclusion, the district
court attempted to surmise what the Oklahoma Supreme Court would say.292
Relying on the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Macsenti v. Becker,
it “erred on the side of caution and interpreted Oklahoma’s collateral source
broadly to exclude evidence of payments by third-parties when it was unclear
how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would resolve the specific application of
the collateral rule.”293  Ultimately, the court in Simpson denied the defendant’s
motion with respect to both Medicare payments and write-offs.294
The Simpson court ignored the distinction between Medicare payments and
Medicare write-offs, leading to a misapplication of the collateral source rule.
Other courts have ignored this distinction as well, applying the collateral
source rule to both the payment and the write-off.295  This distinction is an
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Medicaid/Medicare write-offs are not a collateral source”).
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979) (emphasis added).
300. See 2002 WL 922137, at *5; see also supra text accompanying notes 202-04.
301. Terrell v. Nanda, 33,242, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/00); 759 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (quoting
Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708, 719 (M.D.N.C. 1976)); see also
important one that has a significant impact on recoverable damages in
Oklahoma and, consequently, the cost of health care in Oklahoma.  The district
court’s failure to draw this distinction provides Oklahoma courts with faulty
persuasive authority.
The Simpson case exemplifies the need for Oklahoma courts to interpret
Oklahoma’s new collateral source rule and the policy rationales supporting it.
Because both the United States and Oklahoma court systems rely heavily on
case precedent, both binding and persuasive, it is important for courts to
provide a correct interpretation of a law early in its existence, before incorrect
interpretations become persuasive or even binding.  This comment argues that
Oklahoma courts should follow the rationale presented in Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Medical Center296 and Wildermuth v. Staton.297 
B. Arguments Against Excluding Evidence of Medicare and Medicaid
Write-Offs
To begin, the correct interpretation of the collateral source rule is one where
the rule does not apply to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs at all.298
Although many jurisdictions reason differently and apply the collateral source
rule to these types of write-offs, the injured party should only be allowed to
recover the amount actually paid by the health-care provider.  The collateral
source rule only applies to “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the
injured party from other sources.”299  By definition, Medicare and Medicaid
write-offs do not constitute “payments” since they are never paid, as explained
in Wildermuth.300  From a policy standpoint, it seems unfair to allow “the
taxpayers to bear the expense of providing free medical care to a person and
then allow that person to recover damages for medical expenses from a tort-
feasor and pocket the windfall.”301  This is not to say that those who receive
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Medicare and Medicaid should not be allowed to sue for damages against a
negligent party.  Rather, this approach would merely limit an injured plaintiff’s
recovery to the amount actually paid by Medicare or Medicaid.  This would
allow the injured party to recover some amount in damages while staying in
line with the policy objective of damages, which is to put an injured party back
into the position he or she was in before the incident occurred.302
Shifting interests in Oklahoma support this interpretation of the collateral
source rule’s inapplicability to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.
Traditionally, there were two justifications for the collateral source rule: First,
if either the tortfeasor or the injured plaintiff had to receive a windfall, public
policy sided with the injured plaintiff.303  Second, allowing plaintiffs to recover
amounts paid by collateral sources encouraged citizens to carry insurance.304
Despite these traditional justifications, newer policy rationales seem to be
prevailing, justifying a shift away from the collateral source rule’s traditional,
broad application.
The promotion of economic interests is arguably the controlling interest in
Oklahoma currently.  This policy favors a narrower collateral source rule.  In
2003, Oklahoma governor Brad Henry started the Economic Development
Generating Excellence (EDGE) project to “significantly improve Oklahoma’s
economy and quality of life.”305  This initiative included a tort reform proposal,
which partly consisted of altering the collateral source rule to help reduce
business costs.306  This tort reform became known as the Affordable Access to
Health Care Act and was passed to “keep medical malpractice insurance rates
affordable and improve access to quality health care,” which, as Governor
Henry explained, is good for “state economic development efforts.”307
Therefore, the policy objective of the AAHCA and the new collateral source
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rule appears to be providing affordable health care to individuals, rather than
preventing a defendant from receiving a windfall.
If economic interests such as keeping health-care costs lower and giving
more people access to health care are now the controlling interests, then the
argument that Medicare and Medicaid write-offs are not subject to the
collateral source rule is strengthened.  “Doctors and hospitals already [have]
a disincentive to take on Medicare patients” because of low profit margins,308
and the same can be argued with respect to Medicaid patients.  If injured
plaintiffs were allowed to recover the amount paid by Medicare or Medicaid
as well as the amount written off, health-care providers might have an even
greater disincentive to provide health services to these types of patients.  Why?
Because Medicare and Medicaid write-offs “often constitute a significant
percentage of the total amount billed”;309 thus, health-care providers’ costs
could dramatically increase.  With approximately 16% of Oklahoma’s
population already on Medicare310 and approximately 20% already on
Medicaid,311 Oklahoma cannot afford for health-care providers to turn down
these types of patients.  Such a result would frustrate the Oklahoma
Legislature’s goal of providing more people with access to health care.
The author maintains that the correct interpretation of the collateral source
rule is that the rule is inapplicable to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.
Nonetheless, if Oklahoma courts were to classify these write-offs as
“payments,” thereby subjecting them to the collateral source rule, the newly
codified rule under the AAHCA would still make the write-offs admissible in
medical liability cases.  Title 63, section 1-1708.1D of the Oklahoma Statutes
provides the newly codified collateral source rule:
A. In every medical liability action, the court shall admit
evidence of payments of medical bills made to the injured party,
unless the court makes the finding described in paragraph B of this
section.
B. In any medical liability action, upon application of a party,
the court shall make a determination whether amounts claimed by
a health care provider to be a payment of medical bills from a
collateral source is [sic] subject to subrogation or other right of
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recovery.  If the court makes a determination that any such
payment is subject to subrogation or other right of recovery,
evidence of the payment from the collateral source and subject to
subrogation or other right of recovery shall not be admitted.312
The plain language of Oklahoma’s new collateral source rule indicates that
Medicare and Medicaid write-offs are admissible into evidence in medical
liability cases.  Medical liability actions include “any civil action involving,
or contingent upon, personal injury or wrongful death brought against a health
care provider based on professional negligence.”313  So long as a party meets
the statutory requirements and the case involves a medical liability action, this
statute “requires the court to admit evidence of payments made to the plaintiff
from collateral sources” except where particular “payment[s] [are] subject to
subrogation.”314  Thus, even if a court erroneously classified write-offs as
payments, the write-offs would still be admissible into evidence.  This is
because Medicare and Medicaid write-offs are not subject to subrogation,315
so they do not fall within the paragraph B exception of the Oklahoma statute,
which excludes those payments subject to some right of recovery.316
Since this comment specifically focuses on Oklahoma’s goal of keeping
health-care costs down, it is primarily concerned with the inapplicability of the
state’s collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs in medical
liability cases.  Nonetheless, another possible question needs to be addressed:
does the collateral source rule exclude evidence of write-offs in personal injury
cases against a party other than a health-care provider?  Proponents of
excluding these write-offs would likely contend that cases like Simpson are not
medical liability cases, but rather personal injury cases in which Oklahoma’s
traditional collateral source rule should be followed.  There are two basic
responses to this argument: First, as this comment has contended all along,
such write-offs—no matter the type of injury—are not recoverable for reasons
already described herein.  Second, though the specific language of title 63,
section 1-1708.1D of the Oklahoma Statutes arguably applies only to personal
injury cases where the injury was caused by a health-care provider, the policy
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goal of lowering health-care costs in Oklahoma supports an extension of the
statutory rule to write-offs in all personal injury cases.  Conversely, if
Oklahoma courts decide that the policy justifications are not strong enough
and they decide to apply the collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid
write-offs, then it is up to the Oklahoma Legislature to clarify that it wants the
new rule to apply in other personal injury suits as well.
One reasonable solution would be to borrow the current rule from Texas,
an approach which was considered during tort reform discussions after passage
of the AAHCA.317  At the time Oklahoma passed the AAHCA, Texas had not
yet altered its collateral source rule;318 however, just one week later, Texas
updated its reform by addressing recoverable medical damages.319  After
Texas’s update and urging from Oklahoma House Republicans, Governor
Henry publicly proposed additional Oklahoma initiatives for tort reform.320  He
suggested borrowing many of Texas’s reforms, because Texas had “enacted
a balanced reform package that helped business and protected the rights of the
individual.”321 
Oklahoma should take another look at Texas’s reforms, because Texas did
precisely what Oklahoma should do with respect to Medicare and Medicaid
write-offs.  Texas’s statute very clearly provides that “recovery of medical or
health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred
by or on behalf of the claimant.”322  It also makes explicit that “claimants are
not entitled to recover write-offs, whether by Medicaid[] [or] Medicare,”323 in
any type of case.  The statute undoubtedly limits the amount an injured
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plaintiff can recover to the amount paid,324 which does not include the portion
of medical bills written off.  It also limits the recoverable amount to the
expenses incurred,325 which excludes write-offs since no party ever incurs an
that is expense written off.326  Though a reasonable interpretation of
Oklahoma’s collateral source rule indicates that it is inapplicable to Medicare
and Medicaid write-offs, adoption of Texas’s law would definitively resolve
the issue of whether write-offs are recoverable in medical liability and other
personal injury actions.
V. Conclusion
Although Oklahoma courts have been silent on the issue of whether the
collateral source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, it is
important that courts understand the reasoning and justification for the rule so
that they can formulate rational and logical precedent on this issue.  “In health
care liability claims, and in most personal injury claims for that matter,
medical expenses related to the care and treatment of the injury alleged by the
claimant often constitute a significant portion of the damages that might be
recovered at trial.”327  Understanding exactly what claimants can recover and
what rules apply is essential to calculating an appropriate amount of damages.
The collateral source rule is one of the tools that guide this endeavor.
In Oklahoma, the collateral source rule should not be used to prevent
defendants from entering evidence of Medicare and Medicaid write-offs,
because, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found, the rule is simply not
applicable to illusory charges.328  The rule only applies to payments, and write-
offs clearly are not any sort of payment.  Thus, the rule does not apply to
write-offs by its own terms.
This interpretation of the collateral source rule makes even more sense in
Oklahoma, given the state’s new policy shift toward economic interests and
providing accessible and affordable health care to its citizens.  Larger
settlements and jury awards increase the overall cost of health care.329
Allowing claimants to recover Medicare and Medicaid write-offs would only
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increase settlements and jury awards, thereby increasing the overall cost of
health care.  Classifying these write-offs as recoverable would ultimately
impede the very goal the Oklahoma Legislature is trying to achieve—more
affordable health care.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia provided the
best rationale for allowing defendants to enter evidence of Medicare and
Medicaid write-offs:
Discounting is a reality of modern medical economics and it
does no violence to the collateral source doctrine to bring to the tort
compensation system the same intended savings.  By allowing the
plaintiff to show the discounted medical expenses as evidence of
his damages, even though he paid no part of them, but refusing any
evidence of the write-offs that no one incurred, there is a proper
balance of [all] the competing interests at issue.330
Thus, the conclusion that the collateral source rule does not apply to Medicare
and Medicaid write-offs is not only supported by Oklahoma’s economic
justifications for the new rule, but it also strikes a closer balance of the
traditional competing interests.  Specifically, if the rule were not applied, an
injured plaintiff would receive “compensation sufficient to make him whole,
but no more,” and the tortfeasor would still be responsible for the damages that
he proximately caused.331  Allowing the plaintiff to recover Medicare or
Medicaid write-offs would grant an unnecessary windfall.
Oklahoma courts must correctly address this issue early and avoid reliance
on erroneous, yet persuasive, authority.  An Oklahoma federal court has
already applied the collateral source rule to Medicare write-offs,332 mistakenly
relying on Rose I and other similar cases.  It is imperative for Oklahoma courts
to diverge from this ruling in order to meet the policy goals set forth by the
Oklahoma Legislature and Governor Henry.  This comment strongly urges
Oklahoma courts to decide this specific issue and interpret the collateral source
rule as inapplicable to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs, regardless of the
type of legal cause of action.
Michael W. Cromwell
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